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Abstract 
New evidence is presented on the sudden shift in the sentiment of market participants with the outbreak of 
the sovereign debt crisis. Since volatility reflects the extent to which the market evaluates the arrival of new 
information and provides useful insights into the dynamics of EMU sovereign debt markets, we analyse their 
spillovers. To that end, we first examine the unconditional patterns during the full sample (April 1999-January 
2014) using a measure recently proposed by Diebold and Yılmaz (2012). Second, we make use of a dynamic 
analysis to evaluate net directional volatility spillovers for each of the eleven countries under study, and to 
determine whether core and peripheral markets present differences both before and during the crisis periods. 
Finally, we apply a panel analysis to empirically investigate the determinants of net directional spillovers of 
this kind. Our results suggest that slightly more than half of the total variance of the forecast errors is 
explained by shocks across countries rather than by idiosyncratic shocks. Besides, they give further support to 
the idea that during the pre-crisis period, most of the triggers in the volatility spillovers were central countries 
–peripheral countries imported credibility from them- while during the crisis peripheral countries became the 
dominant transmitters.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent financial crises have all been characterized by quick, large-scale regional spillovers 
of negative financial shocks. These have been especially significant in Europe where, after 
the huge distress in the Greek government debt market that culminated in the rescue of 
May 2010, South European countries found their yield spreads with respect to Germany 
spiralling, and also faced skyrocketing refinancing rates. Indeed, an important reason and 
justification for providing financial support to Greece was precisely the “fear” of contagion 
(see Constâncio, 2012); there was a sudden loss in investor confidence and the 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within the rest of EMU countries came firmly under 
the spotlight (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013).  
The significant increase in cross-border financial activity in the euro area since the start of 
the century (see Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010 and Barnes et al., 2010), which has fostered a 
high degree of integration in European financial markets1, and the low degree of fiscal 
federalism are some of the reasons for the speed, as well as the amplitude, of the 
transmission of those shocks. Clearly, empirical studies are needed to evaluate the 
importance of spillovers across public debt markets. 
Researchers have already used a variety of methodologies to study the transmission effects 
in euro area sovereign debt markets (correlation-based measures, conditional value-at-risk 
or Granger-causality approach, among others)2: Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), Metiu 
(2012), Caporin et al. (2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Gorea and Radev (2014), 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) and Ludwig (2014) to name a few. Our paper adds 
to this literature by applying the methodology recently proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012) to measure spillover effects using a generalized vector autoregressive framework in 
                                                          
1 See Schoenmaker and Wagner (2013) 
2 See Biblio et al. (2012) for a review of the different measures proposed in the literature to estimate these linkages.  
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which forecast-error variance decompositions are invariant to the variable ordering.  This 
methodology allows us to examine the relative importance of both within-market and 
cross-market information in explaining volatility movements in each EMU sovereign bond 
market. Besides, it also allows us: (1)  To evaluate total spillovers of volatility across these 
markets; (2) To compute net directional volatility spillovers summarizing information about 
how much each market contributes to the volatility in other markets, in net terms; (3) To 
produce continuously-varying indexes of total and net directional spillovers illustrating how 
markets evolved over time and reacted to the impressive number of specific events that 
took place during the sample; and (4) To map out the complex network of volatility 
interlinkages among the eleven markets in our sample.  
Besides, to our knowledge, although there is a substantial body of literature using different 
extensions of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012)’s methodology to examine spillovers and 
transmission effects in stock, foreign exchange, or oil markets in non-EMU countries3, it 
has only rarely been applied to euro area sovereign debt markets (Antonakakis and Vergos, 
2013, Claeys and Vašicek, 2014 and Glover and Richards-Shubik, 2014 are some of the few 
exceptions)4. Nevertheless, in contrast to those studies, we focus our analysis on sovereign 
debt market volatility, since as far as we know; there are no empirical analyses of the effects 
of spillovers on sovereign market volatility, in spite of the relevance of the issue.  
In this sense, as volatility reflects the extent to which the market evaluates and assimilates 
the arrival of new information, the analysis of its transmission pattern might provide useful 
insights into the characteristics and dynamics of sovereign debt markets. So, since the 
information gathered would provide a barometer for the vulnerability of these markets, we 
                                                          
3 Awartania et al., (2013), Lee and Chang (2013), Chau and Deesomsak (2014) or Cronin (2014) apply this methodology to 
examine spillovers in the United States markets; Yilmaz (2010), Zhou et al. (2012) or Narayan et al. (2014) focus their 
analysis on Asian countries; Apostolakisa and Papadopoulos (2014) and Tsai (2014) examine G-7 economies; whilst 
Duncan and Kabundi (2013) center their analysis on South African markets.  
4 Alter and Beyer (2014) also apply this methodology to quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in 
the euro area. 
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consider that to empirically examine spillovers on sovereign debt market volatility is a 
novel and relevant issue. Moreover, during crises, markets’ volatilities tend to increase 
rapidly, and financial analysts seem to believe that volatility shocks in one market can easily 
have an impact on the other markets. Thus, the European debt crisis is ideal for testing net 
directional spillovers, identifying when and where they started in sovereign bond markets 
and how subsequently spread to the rest of countries. 
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to contribute to this challenging avenue of 
research by focusing on the effects of spillovers on EMU sovereign bond market volatility. 
Unlike previous studies, in our analysis we will focus on euro area countries; though we 
consider both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) 
and peripheral EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain)5 and work with 
10-year yields instead of spreads over the German bund, in order to be able to include 
Germany in the study. Furthermore, whilst other studies analyse bond yield spread 
spillovers (Antonankakis and Vergos, 2013, among them), we will study bond yields’ 
volatility spillovers. We will analyse the determinants of the detected pair-wise net 
directional spillovers, considering not only macroeconomic fundamentals, but also the role 
played by indicators of investor sentiment. Finally, we examine an extended time period 
spanning from the inception of the euro in January 1999, well before the global financial 
and sovereign debt crises, until January 2014, covering the Greek write-off and the 
agreement with Greece’s creditor banks in 2012 and the decision of Eurogroup to consider 
bail-ins in the future, that was eventually decided in 2013, after the crisis in Cyprus. 
                                                          
5 This distinction between central and peripheral countries has been extensively used in the empirical literature. The two 
groups we consider roughly correspond to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between those 
countries whose currencies continuously participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its 
inception maintaining broadly stable bilateral exchange rates among themselves over the sample period, and those 
countries whose currencies either entered the ERM later or suspended its participation in the ERM, as well as fluctuating 
in value to a great extent relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups are also roughly the same found in Jacquemin 
and Sapir (1996), applying multivariate analysis techniques to a wide set of structural and macroeconomic indicators, to 
form a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same that those found in 
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according to the perception of economic agents with respect to the commitment to 
maintain the exchange rate around a central parity in the ERM and those identifying by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-
Zumaquero (2012) using cluster analysis when analysing permanent and transitory volatilities of EMU sovereign yields. 
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Our results suggest that a little more than half of the total variance of the forecast errors is 
explained by shocks across countries rather than by idiosyncratic shocks. Besides, they give 
further support to the idea that during the pre-crisis period, most of the triggers in the 
volatility spillovers were central countries –peripheral countries imported credibility from 
them- while during the crisis peripheral countries became the dominant transmitters. These 
results are in line with those of Antonakakis and Vergos (2013) who also highlight the 
increased vulnerability of EMU countries from the destabilizing shocks originating from 
the beleaguered peripheral countries rather than from core countries during the crisis. 
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we discuss the econometric methodology. Section 3 
describes our data and presents our empirical results (both static and dynamic). In Section 
4 we present the empirical results regarding the pair-wise net directional spillovers and 
examine their determinants. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main findings and offers 
some concluding remarks. 
2. Econometric methodology 
We use the method developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). The starting point of the 
analysis is the following p-order, N-variable Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model: 
1
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where the N×N coefficient matrices 
iA  are estimated by the recursion 
1 1 2 2 ... ,i i i p i pA A A A        with 0A  being an N×N identity matrix and with 
0iA  for 0.i   Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) use the generalized VAR framework of Koop 
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), in which variance decompositions are invariant in 
terms of the variable ordering. In this case, the H-step-ahead forecast error variance 
decomposition is defined as follows: 
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where Σ is the variance matrix for the error vector ε, jj  is the standard deviation of  the 
error term for the jth equation, and 
ie  is the selection vector, with one as the ith element 
and zeros otherwise. 
In the generalized VAR framework, the shocks to each variable are not orthogonalized; 
therefore, the sum of each row of the variance decomposition matrix does not add to unity 
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Using the normalized elements of the decomposition matrix of equation (4), we construct 
the total volatility spillover index: 
, 1 , 1
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This index captures the level of cross-country spillovers by measuring the contribution of 
the spillovers of volatility across all countries to the total forecast error variance. To 
examine the spillover effects from and toward a specific country, we use directional 
volatility spillovers. Specifically, the directional volatility spillovers received by market i 
from all other markets j are defined as follows: 
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In a similar fashion, the directional volatility spillovers transmitted by market i to all other 
markets j are defined as follows: 
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The net directional volatility spillover provides information on whether a market is a 
receiver or a transmitter of volatility in net terms. We obtain the net spillover from market i 
to all other markets j by subtracting equation (7) from equation (6). Thus, the net 
directional volatility spillover is given by the following: 
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To examine the net pairwise volatility spillover between markets i and j, we compute the 
difference between the gross volatility shocks transmitted from market i to market j and 
those transmitted from j to i: 
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3. Data and empirical results 
3.1. Data 
We use daily data of 10-year bond yield from data collected from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream for eleven EMU countries: both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain). Our sample begins on 1 April 1999 and ends on 27 January 2014 (i. e., a total 
of 3,868 observations)6, spanning several important financial market episodes in addition to 
the crisis of 2007-2008 – in particular, the euro area sovereign debt crisis from 2009 
onwards. Following Parkinson (1980) , we estimate the daily variance using daily high and 
low prices7. For market i on day t we have 
2 20.36[ln( ) ln( )] .MAX MINit it itP P     (10) 
where MAXitP  it is the maximum (high) price in market I on day t, and 
MIN
itP  is the daily 
minimum (low) price. Given that 2it  is an estimator of the daily variance, the 
                                                          
6 The sample starts in April 1999 since data for Greece are only available from that date. 
7 We also used the absolute standardized log-return and the squared returns as alternative measures of daily volatility, 
being the results qualitatively similar. 
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corresponding estimate of the annualized daily percent standard deviation (volatility) is 
2 2100 365 .it it   
3.2. Total spillovers 
Table 1 displays the total volatility spillovers computed for the whole sample. The off-
diagonal column sums (labelled “Contributions to others”) or row sums (labelled 
“Contributions from others”), are the “to” and “from” directional spillovers, and the 
“from minus to” differences are the net volatility spillovers. In addition, the total volatility 
spillover index appears in the lower right corner of the spillover table. It is approximately 
the grand off-diagonal column sum (or row sum) relative to the grand column sum 
including diagonals (or row sum including diagonals), expressed as a percentage. As can be 
seen, we obtain a value of 54.23% for the total volatility spillover index among the eleven 
countries under study, indicating that slightly more than half of the total variance of the 
forecast errors during the sample is explained by shocks across countries, whereas the 
remaining 45.77% is explained by idiosyncratic shocks. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Regarding pairwise directional spillovers (the off-diagonal elements of the upper-left 11 × 
11 submatrix), the highest observed pairwise volatility spillover is from Italy to Spain 
(34.03%). In return, the pairwise volatility spillover from Spain to Italy (25.27%) is second-
highest. The highest pairwise spillover value between EMU central countries is from 
France to Austria (20.03%), followed by that from France to the Netherlands (18.85%).  
In terms of the directional spillovers to others throughout the full sample, our results 
suggest that volatility in Finnish bond yields contributed the most to other countries’ 
forecast error variance (78.58 points), followed by Dutch bond yields (78.24 points), 
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French bond yields (74.83 points), Austrian bond yields (74.15 points) and German bond 
yields (71.23 points). According to the full sample volatility spillover measures, Belgium, 
Italy and Spain occupy intermediate positions (62.02, 53.63 and 48.99 points respectively), 
while Ireland, Greece and Portugal contributed similar rates (16.48, 13.69 and 13.17 points 
respectively). 
As for the directional spillovers received from others, Germany appears to be the country 
that received the highest percentage of shocks from other countries (79.95) followed by 
Finland (79.61 points) and the Netherlands (79.36 points). Greece received the lowest 
percentage (7.34 points) of shocks from other countries, followed by Ireland (28.82 points) 
and Italy (32 points).  
Finally, we calculate the difference between the column-wise sum (the “Contribution to 
others”) and the row-wise sum (“Contribution from others”) to obtain the “net directional 
volatility spillovers”. Italy (21.63 points) and Spain (10.68 points) are net transmitters of 
bond yield shocks to other countries, while Austria (-2.02 points), the Netherlands (-1.12 
points) and Finland (-1.03 points) received very low percentage of bond yield shocks in net 
terms. On the other hand, Portugal (-32.37 points) and Ireland (-12.34 points) are definitely 
the leading net receivers of bond yield shocks over the full period. These results are in line 
with those presented in Suh (2015) applying new measures of contagion effects during the 
recent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
To gain further insights into the dynamics of the total volatility spillovers, we now estimate 
them using a VAR(2) approximating model with a one-sided rolling estimation window of 
200 days8 and 10 days as the predictive horizon for the underlying variance decomposition, 
and assess the extent and nature of spillover variation over time via the corresponding time 
                                                          
8 Following Inoue, Jin and Rossi (2014), we choose the optimal window size that minimizes the conditional mean square 
forecast errors. This procedure is found to perform quite well under various types of structural changes. 
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series of spillover indexes, which we examine graphically in the total spillover plot in Figure 
1.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
As can be seen in Figure 1, we identify two periods9, being April 6 2009 the breakpoint. 
Therefore, during the first period (from April 1 1999 to April 5 2009), which is denoted as 
the pre-crisis period, yield volatility was substantially transmitted to others (we should recall 
that, in this period, euro sovereign bond markets were highly connected and yield spreads 
moved in a narrow range close to zero); while in the second one (from April 6 2009 till the 
end of the sample period), denoted crisis period, in parallel with the disconnection in 
sovereign markets behaviour (yield spreads against the German bund spiralled), the 
spillover of bond yield volatility registered a decrease. The breakpoint (April 6 2009) 
coincides with a statement by the ECB expressing its fears of slowdown in financial market 
integration, and only some months before Papandreou’s government reported Greece’s 
distressed debt position (November 2009)10.  
4. Net pairwise directional volatility spillovers 
We now focus on the net directional spillover plots to explore the time-varying differences 
between directional TO and directional FROM spillovers (i.e., ‘TO–FROM’) for our eleven 
sovereign yields. In particular, we examined the 110 net pair-wise directional volatility 
spillovers. The resulting figures (not shown here to save space, but available from the 
                                                          
9 Formal mean and volatility tests (not shown here to save space, but available from the authors upon request) strongly 
reject the null hypothesis of equality in mean and variance before and after April 6 2009, suggesting the existence of two 
regimes. 
10 In November 2009, Papandreou’s government disclosed that its finances were far worse than previously announced, 
with a yearly deficit of 12.7% of GDP, four times more than the euro area’s limit (and more than double the previously 
published figure), and a public debt of $410 billion. We should recall that this announcement only served to worsen the 
severe crisis in the Greek economy; the country’s debt rating was lowered to BBB+ (the lowest in the euro zone) on 
December 8. These episodes marked the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. 
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authors upon request)11 indicate that during the period under study Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal were the dominant net transmitters of sovereign bond volatility, while Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain, were mostly on the 
receiving end of net volatility transmission. Additionally, the results also reveal that net 
directional volatility spillovers vary greatly over time.  
Figures 2a to 2c synthetically display the main results for our dynamic analysis of net pair-
wise directional spillovers, focusing on cases where the intensity was especially significant. 
In the Figures, we provide a visualization of the complex network of volatility overflows 
among the eleven sovereign bond markets in our sample. The width of the arrows indicates 
the intensity of volatility spillovers and the node diameter indicates sovereign debt market 
size. Specifically, Figure 2a shows the most significant net pair-wise directional spillovers 
for the whole sample, whilst Figure 2b and 2c present the main results obtained during the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively12.  
[Figures 2a to 2c here] 
As can be seen, for the whole sample (Figure 2a) in ten out of the fourteen main cases the 
triggers in the volatility spillovers are peripheral countries (the receivers being central 
countries in six cases and peripheral countries in four), while in the remaining four cases 
central countries represent the origin and destiny of the volatility spillovers. It can also be 
seen in Figure 2b that during the pre-crisis period, in 23 out of the 26 relevant cases the 
dominant triggers in the volatility spillovers are central countries (the receivers being 
peripheral countries in fourteen cases and central countries only in nine), while peripheral 
countries are the origin of the volatility spillovers in only three cases (the destination being 
                                                          
11 However, a subset that encompasses the most important patterns found in the pre-crisis and crisis period is presented 
in Figures 3a and 3b.  
12 Figures 2a to 2c only show the most important directional connections between the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields 
under study which correspond to the cases where we detect a net pair-wise directional connection in 64-75%, 76-87% and 
88-100% of the sample. They account for a total of 14 connections when we study the whole sample (Figure 2a), 26 in 
the pre-crisis period (Figure 2b) and 42 in the crisis period (Figure 2c). 
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a peripheral country in all three). Finally, Figure 2c suggest that, during the crisis period, the 
pattern of major net pair-wise directional spillovers radically changes, both in intensity (the 
amount detected in the tenth percentile represents 71% of the total, whilst we detected no 
spillovers in that percentile in the pre-crisis period) and in direction: in 35 out of the 42 
cases the main triggers in the volatility spillovers are peripheral countries (the receivers 
being central countries in 29 cases and peripheral countries in six), while only in seven 
cases are central countries the origin (and destination) of the volatility spillovers. 
Taken together, the evidence thus far suggests that there are important episodes of 
volatility spillovers across EMU sovereign bond markets and that, as the crisis intensified, 
so too did the volatility spillovers with a significant change in the spillover direction. 
Therefore, these results could reinforce the idea that during the first ten years of currency 
union, investors overestimated the healing effect that “sound” central countries might have 
on the rest of the Eurozone, and spillovers ran mostly from central to peripheral countries 
(accounting for 54% of the total; fourteen cases out of twenty six). However, with the 
onset of the crisis the situation changed radically: suddenly, market participants focused 
their attention on the major macroeconomic imbalances in some peripheral countries, 
which might not only lead them to default, but might also affect the central countries 
which held a substantial proportion of  their sovereign assets Therefore, in the crisis 
period, not only the number and the intensity of volatility spillovers increased but their 
direction as well, now running mostly from peripheral to central countries (they account 
for 69% of the total; twenty nine cases out of forty two). The detailed time-varying 
behaviour of net pairwise spillovers between these subsets of countries is presented in 
Figure 3a and Figure 3b. Concretely, Figure 3a displays the main net spillovers in the pre-
crisis period (i.e., 14 relationships running from central to peripheral countries), whilst 
  
14 
Figure 3b shows the main net spillovers in the crisis one (i.e., 29 relationships running from 
peripheral to central countries).  
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b here] 
Figures 3a and 3b complement the information presented in Figures 2a to 2c; they show 
not just the change in the spillovers’ direction with the crisis, but also the huge increase in 
their number and intensity. 
4.1 Determinants of net pairwise directional volatility spillovers 
4.1.1 Econometric methodology 
After evaluating net pairwise directional volatility spillovers, we proceed now to analyse 
their determinants. We adopt an agnostic data-driven approach, using a general-to-specific 
modelling strategy with panel data techniques, to empirically assess the relevance of the 
variables proposed in the recent theoretical and empirical literature as potential drivers of 
EMU sovereign bond yield spreads in explaining the net pairwise volatility spillovers we 
have calculated. 
Since the potential determinants are available at monthly or quarterly frequency, we 
generate a new dependent variable computing the monthly average of the daily net pairwise 
directional volatility spillovers for each country. 
4.1.2. Instruments for modelling net pairwise directional volatility spillovers 
Following Dornbusch et al. (2000), we distinguish between two types of potential reasons 
for the evolution of net pairwise directional volatility spillovers: fundamentals-based 
variables and investor behaviour-based determinants. 
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As far as the macro-fundamentals are concerned, in accordance with the literature, we 
include measures of the country’s fiscal position (the government debt-to-GDP and the 
government deficit-to-GDP, DEB and DEF hereafter), the liquidity differences between 
markets (the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt, LIQ)13, the foreign debt and net 
position of the country towards the rest of the world (the current-account-balance-to-GDP 
ratio, CAC) and a measure of inflation as a proxy of the country’s loss of competitiveness 
(the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices monthly inter-annual rate of growth, INF). 
These variables have been widely used in the empirical literature as potential drivers of 
both sovereign yields and sovereign default (see, e. g., Gómez-Puig et al., 2014 and 
Chakrabarti and Zeaiter, 2014). With respect to market sentiment proxies, we use the 
consumer confidence indicator (CCI) to gauge economic agents’ perceptions of future 
economic activity and the monthly standard deviation of equity returns (EVOL) in each 
country to capture local stock market volatility. All this variables are in relative terms and 
represent the difference between their values in the two countries involved in the net 
directional bond yield volatility spillovers.  Since we have detected (see Figure 1) that in 
periods of sovereign debt markets stability, total volatility spillover is much higher than in 
periods of distress in public debt markets, we expect that the instrumental variables impact 
on net directional volatility spillovers presents the opposite sign that the one they had on 
yield spreads. Therefore, we would expect a positive relationship between the variables 
CAC, LIQ and CCI with net directional volatility spillovers; and a negative relationship for 
the variables DEB, DEF, INF and EVOL (see Gómez-Puig et al., 2014). 
 
                                                          
13 Given the large size differences observed between EMU peripheral sovereign debt markets (see Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013), it is likely that the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt (which is considered a measure of 
market depth because larger markets may present lower information costs since their securities are likely to trade 
frequently, and a relatively large number of investors may own or may have analysed their features) might be a good proxy 
of liquidity differences between markets. Indeed, some of the literature indicates the importance of market size in the 
success of a debt market.  
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A summary with the definitions and sources of all the explanatory variables used is 
presented in Appendix A. 
4.1.3. Empirical results 
As mentioned above, we start our eclectic empirical analysis with a general unrestricted 
statistical model including all explanatory variables that might influence the variables being 
modelled, which in our case are net pairwise directional volatility spillovers. Using standard 
testing procedures, we search down to the smallest model with the greatest explanatory 
power, based on sequences of t tests and F-tests to check the validity of the reductions at 
each stage in order to ensure the congruence of the finally selected model (Hendry, 1995, 
ch. 9). 
The first column in Tables 2 to 5 shows the final estimation results during the whole 
sample period for net pairwise volatility spillovers between four groups of countries: (1) all 
EMU countries, (2) EMU central countries, (3) EMU peripheral countries and (4) between 
EMU central and peripheral countries. The results in the second column of these tables 
take into account the dynamic properties of the explanatory variables by introducing a 
dummy to analyse the differences in the coefficients’ significance over time (i.e., during the 
stability and the crisis periods).   
Therefore, in addition to the chosen independent variables, a dummy (DCRISIS, taking the 
value 1 in the crisis period and 0 otherwise) is also introduced in the estimations and the 
coefficients of the interactions between this dummy and the rest of variables are 
calculated14: 
β  = β1 + β2DCRISIS 
 
                                                          
14 See Gómez-Puig (2006 and 2008) 
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Then, the marginal effects of each variable are: 
β  = β1 (in the stability period) 
β  = β1 + β2 (in the crisis period) 
All the results reported in Tables 2 to 5 were obtained using the Fixed Effects (FE) model 
which is the relevant model in all cases15.   
[Insert Tables 2 to 5 here] 
Looking across the columns in these tables, and examining the spillovers between all eleven 
countries (Table 2) and only between central and peripheral countries (Table 5) some 
common patterns can be observed. With regard to the variables measuring market 
sentiment, we find a negative, significant effect for stock-market volatility (EVOL), 
whereas, as expected, the consumer confidence indicator (CCI) presents a positive sign. As 
for the local macro-fundamentals, our results suggest a negative impact on net directional 
spillovers of one variable that measures the fiscal position (the government debt-to-GDP) 
and another one that gauges the country’s level of competitiveness (INF)16.  Moreover, 
without exception, all marginal effects register an increase in the crisis period compared to 
the pre-crisis period. This rise in the sensitivity to both fundamentals and market 
sentiments during the crisis period compared with the pre-crisis period is in line with the 
previous empirical literature (see Gómez-Puig et al., 2014, among others). The reassessment 
of objectively unchanged fundamentals in other countries, when a crisis occurs in one 
country is what Goldstein (1998) calls ‘wake-up call’ contagion, since it draws the attention 
                                                          
15  We consider three basic panel regression methods: the fixed-effects (FE) method, the random effects (RE) model and 
the pooled-OLS method. In order to determine the empirical relevance of each of the potential methods for our panel 
data, we use several statistic tests. Specifically, we test FE versus RE using the Hausman test statistic to test for non-
correlation between the unobserved effect and the regressors. To choose between pooled-OLS and RE, we use Breuch 
and Pagan (1980)’s Lagrange multiplier test to test for the presence of an unobserved effect. Finally, we use the F test for 
fixed effects to test whether all unobservable individual effects are zero, in order to discriminate between pooled-OLS 
and RE. To save space, we do not show these tests here, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
16 Besides, our proxy for the market liquidity also turns out to be significant in the estimations of the spillovers within 
central and peripheral countries (Table 5).  
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of market participants to existing problems or risks they failed to see beforehand, and so is 
the result of an efficient correction that leads to a more accurate assessment of 
fundamentals.  
It is worth noting that our analysis highlights the differences between the two groups of 
EMU countries: central and peripheral. In net directional spillover episodes between 
central countries (see Table 3), variables that gauge macroeconomic fundamentals seem to 
present a relatively higher relevance, while participants’ perceptions seem to play a major 
role in relationships between peripheral countries (see Table 4). In both cases, four 
variables assessing macroeconomic fundamentals are significant with the expected sign.  
However, while only one variable measuring market sentiment (the consumer confidence 
indicator, CCI) is statistically significant to explain spillovers between central countries, two 
variables (EVOL and CCI) are significant with the expected sign in the case of peripheral 
countries. Again, without exception, for the two groups of countries all marginal effects 
register an increase in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. 
Therefore, our results indicate that the crisis had a significant impact on the markets’ 
reactions to financial news, especially in EMU peripheral countries. In this respect, some 
authors have argued that a financial crisis might spread from one country to another due to 
market imperfection or to the herding behaviour of international investors. For instance, 
Beirne and Fratscher (2013) also indicate that for EMU peripheral countries there is strong 
evidence in favour of this hypothesis, though for other countries the evidence is much 
weaker since macroeconomic fundamentals are more relevant. Moreover, the time-varying 
impact of the different variables in the crisis and pre-crisis periods is another interesting 
finding that supports the idea that, when a shock occurs, market participants reconsider the 
effects of relevant variables. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The recent crisis has underlined that the cross-border transmission of shocks can be rapid 
and powerful in the EMU, where trade and financial inter-linkages are strong and where 
confidence effects have been shown to be an important transmission mechanism. In 
particular, sovereign markets have been identified as powerful vectors of contagion during 
the crisis; therefore, a good understanding of cross-border spillovers within the euro area is 
essential for policy coordination and design.  
In this paper we have used a measure recently proposed by Diebold and Yılmaz (2012) to 
assess the volatility spillovers in EMU sovereign bond markets during the period April 
1999 to January 2014. To gain further insight into the recent state of financial instability in 
these markets, we have examined both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands) and peripheral EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain). 
For the whole sample, we have obtained a value of 54.23% for the total volatility spillover 
index among the eleven countries under study. Italy and Spain are the main net transmitters 
of bond yields shocks to other countries, while Portugal and Ireland are found to be the 
leading net receivers. As for the dynamics of the total volatility spillovers, we have 
identified a first period (denoted the “pre-crisis period”) during which bond yield volatility 
was substantially transmitted to others, and a second one (denoted the “crisis period”) 
during which the spillover of bond yield volatility registered a decrease. April 6 2009 was 
the breakpoint.  
When analysing net pair-wise directional spillovers, our results suggest a radical change in 
their pattern, both in intensity and in direction, after April 2009: during the pre-crisis 
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period most of the triggers in the volatility spillovers are central countries while during the 
crisis period peripheral countries become t 
he dominant transmitters. Additionally, the number of connections in volatility among 
EMU bond markets dramatically increased after the crisis, suggesting a higher cross-market 
exposure.  
Finally, we have found that the key determinants in the central and peripheral countries are 
not the same. Although, in both cases, four variables assessing macroeconomic 
fundamentals are significant with the expected sign (the government debt-to-GDP, the 
current account-to-GDP and the inflation rate in the two group of countries, jointly with 
the measure of market liquidity and the government deficit-to-GDP, in central and 
peripheral countries, respectively); only one variable measuring market sentiment (the 
consumer confidence indicator, CCI) is statistically significant to explain spillovers between 
central countries,  while two variables (EVOL and CCI) are significant with the expected 
sign in the case of peripheral countries. Therefore, these results suggest that variables that 
gauge market participants’ perceptions seem to be more relevant in net volatility spillovers 
between peripheral countries, whilst macroeconomic fundamentals seem to play a major 
role in relationships where only central countries are involved. Nevertheless, it is also 
noticeable that the variables that gauge fiscal distress are more relevant in peripheral 
countries. 
However, in the case of those relationships that run from a central to a peripheral country, 
or vice versa, both types of variable seem to be equally relevant. Finally, without exception, 
all marginal effects register an increase in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis 
period, suggesting that the market participants reassess the relevance of the variables as the 
crisis unfolds. 
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All in all, our results give further support to the hypothesis that, during the first ten years of 
EMU, peripheral countries imported credibility from central countries. With the outbreak 
of the crisis, there was a sudden shift in the sentiment of market participants, who suddenly 
turned their attention to the significant macroeconomic imbalances in some of the 
peripheral countries and the possibility of contagion to central countries.  
The findings of this paper may increase further our understanding of the level and 
transmission mechanism of volatility spillovers across EMU sovereign bond markets, 
drawing attention to the intricate and time-variant linkages that exist between such markets. 
They may be of use to market regulators in their attempts to formulate effective policies 
for tackling financial uncertainty and tension transmission, particularly during periods of 
turbulence. 
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Appendix A: Definition of the explanatory variables for modelling net pairwise 
directional volatility spillovers 
A.1. Variables that measure macro-fundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position  
vis-à-vis 
the rest of the 
world 
(CAC)  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations. 
 
OECD 
Competitiveness 
(INF) 
Inflation rate. HICP monthly inter-annual rate 
of growth 
Eurostat  
 
Fiscal Position 
(DEF and DEB) 
 
Government debt-to-GDP and Government 
deficit-to-GDP. Monthly data are linearly 
interpolated from quarterly observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
(LIQ) 
 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector 
Amounts Outstanding (billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from 
quarterly observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. 
Table 18  
 
 
 
A.2. Variables used as proxies of investor behaviour. 
Variable Description Source 
 
Stock Volatility 
(EVOL) 
Monthly standard deviation of the daily 
returns of each country’s stock market 
general index 
 
Datastream 
 
Consumer 
Confidence 
Indicator 
(CCI) 
  
 
This index is built up by the European 
Commission which conducts regular 
harmonised surveys of consumers in each 
country. 
 
European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
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Table 1: Full-sample spillovers 
 GER FRA ITA SPA NET BEL AUS GRE FIN POR IRE Contributions from others 
GER 20.05 18.39 2.83 1.34 17.09 9.79 13.04 0.08 17.20 0.07 0.12 79.95 
FRA 10.38 29.44 1.10 0.29 14.93 13.11 15.48 0.41 14.71 0.09 0.07 70.56 
ITA 0.52 0.36 68.00 25.27 0.67 3.08 0.30 0.00 0.76 0.13 0.90 32.00 
SPA 0.22 0.03 34.03 61.69 0.20 1.69 0.08 0.08 0.34 0.38 1.26 38.31 
NET 12.24 18.85 2.74 0.50 20.64 12.72 14.75 0.01 17.38 0.16 0.02 79.36 
BEL 4.89 10.26 12.36 4.91 8.97 41.10 8.48 0.34 8.41 0.10 0.16 58.90 
AUS 9.13 20.03 1.06 0.19 15.11 14.00 23.83 0.55 15.93 0.16 0.01 76.17 
GRE 0.10 0.23 2.89 2.13 0.10 0.12 0.01 92.66 0.03 1.05 0.67 7.34 
FIN 12.09 18.65 3.23 1.04 17.09 11.55 15.74 0.10 20.39 0.09 0.03 79.61 
POR 0.01 0.37 10.13 13.34 0.04 0.04 0.36 10.44 0.04 54.45 10.80 45.55 
IRE 0.07 0.36 8.28 10.23 0.00 1.02 0.12 2.70 0.01 6.04 71.18 28.82 
Contributions to 
Others 
71.23 74.83 53.63 48.99 78.24 62.02 74.15 13.69 78.58 13.17 16.48 Index=54.23% 
Net 
contributions 
(To-From) 
-8.72 4.27 21.63 10.68 -1.12 3.13 -2.02 6.34 -1.03 -32.37 -12.34  
 
Note: GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland, 
respectively. 
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Table 2. Panel regression: All countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant -1.2917* 
(-13.7264) 
-1.1600* 
(-2.5681) 
  -3.0225* 
(-17.4723) 
Fundamental variables 
Inflation Rate -0.7573* 
(-20.6019) 
-0.5181* 
(-10.7612) 
  -.0202* 
(-27.9214) 
Gov. Debt / GDP -0.1150* 
(-14.7865) 
-0.1069* 
(-14.1385) 
  -0.0910* 
(-13.0871) 
Proxies of investor behaviour 
Consumer Confidence 
Indicator 
0.5014* 
(12.1598) 
0.4044* 
(9.2736) 
  0.3381* 
(28.0223) 
Equity Volatility -0.0120* 
(-19.9724) 
-0.0087* 
(-16.2926) 
  -0.0119* 
(-14.3343) 
R2 
Within 
Between 
Overall 
 
0.4176 
0.6703 
0.4732 
 
0.4640 
0.7448 
0.5205 
Observations 18092 
Notes: In brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, computed using White (1980)’s 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. * indicates significance at 1%. 
. 
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Table 3. Panel regression: Central-Central countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant -0.2260* 
(-2.1684) 
 
   
Fundamental variables 
Inflation Rate -1.4425* 
(-14.5449) 
-1.1273* 
(5.3212) 
  -0.3986* 
(3.7390) 
Gov. Debt / GDP -0.3960* 
(-18.4229) 
-0.2327* 
(-10.0917) 
 
  -0.2209* 
(-15.6501) 
Current Account / GDP 0.3207* 
(10.6660) 
0.3358* 
(10.1612) 
  0.0071* 
(6.6614) 
Liquidity-Domestic Debt 
Securities 
0.0060* 
(11.7735) 
0.0054* 
(7.4833) 
  0.0048* 
(12.6223) 
Proxies of investor behaviour 
Consumer Confidence 
Indicator 
0.1817* 
(11.5893) 
0.2219* 
(11.7614) 
  0.0248* 
(12.6255) 
R2 
Within 
Between 
Overall 
 
0.4594 
0.7038 
0.4969 
 
0.4824 
0.7390 
0.5466 
Observations 4980 
Notes: In brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, computed using White (1980)’s 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. * indicates significance at 1%. 
. 
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Table 4. Panel regression: Peripheral-Peripheral countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant -1.4944* 
(-5.7866) 
-1.7160* 
(-6.8014) 
  -0.4054* 
(-9.3624) 
Fundamental variables 
Inflation Rate -2.4872* 
(-11.3238) 
-2.1864* 
(-10.4642) 
  -0.3729* 
(-5.0861) 
Gov. Deficit / GDP -0.2836* 
(-6.1688) 
-0.1055* 
(-6.8612) 
  -0.2988* 
(-11.9701) 
Gov. Debt / GDP -0.1815* 
(-9.6749) 
-0.1918* 
(-8.5503) 
  -0.0088* 
(-3.7342) 
Current Account / GDP 0.6175* 
(5.1249) 
0.8223* 
(6.5712) 
  0.0874* 
(5.8425) 
Proxies of investor behaviour 
Consumer Confidence 
Indicator 
1.0213* 
(37.0696) 
1.0984* 
(5.8021) 
  0.0861* 
(21.3315) 
Equity Volatility -0.0052* 
(-4.4438) 
-0.0058* 
(-8.0632) 
  -0.0205* 
(-8.8014) 
R2 
Within 
Between 
Overall 
 
0.4532 
0.6972 
0.5659 
 
0.6004 
0.8193 
0.5728 
Observations 3052 
Notes: In brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, computed using White (1980)’s 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. * indicates significance at 1%. 
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Table 5. Panel regression: Central-Peripheral countries 
 Without dummy With dummy 
Constant -1.6110* 
(-12.9196) 
-1.8591* 
(10.4412) 
  -0.3715* 
(-16.5224) 
Fundamental variables 
Inflation Rate -0.9990* 
(-21.3251) 
-0.9413* 
(-11.5631) 
  -0.0759* 
(19.5406) 
Gov. Debt / GDP -0.1223* 
(-11.9292) 
-0.1129* 
(-6.6621) 
  -0.0717* 
(-3.1447) 
Liquidity-Domestic Debt 
Securities 
0.0047 
(9.5210) 
0.0042* 
(5.9219) 
  0.0054* 
(13.5775) 
Proxies of investor behaviour 
Consumer Confidence 
Indicator 
0.5041* 
(12.6214) 
0.4101* 
(17.3314) 
  0.1829* 
(26.1811) 
Equity Volatility -0.0127* 
(-17.9196) 
-0 0109* 
(-16.9412) 
  -0.0031* 
(-11.1112) 
R2 
Within 
Between 
Overall 
 
0.4235 
0.5856 
0.5656 
 
0.5748 
0.5650 
0.6199 
Observations 9816 
Notes: In brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, computed using White (1980)’s 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. * indicates significance at 1%. 
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Figure 1: Total volatility spillover  
 
 32 
Figure 2a: Dynamic net pair-wise directional spillovers for the whole sample 
 
 
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections between the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields under study. 
Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in grey scale) correspond, respectively, to the cases 
where we detect a net pair-wise directional connection in 64-75%, 76-87% and 88-100% of the sample. Node size 
indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland, respectively.  
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Figure 2b: Dynamic net pair-wise directional spillovers for the pre-crisis period. 
 
 
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections between the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields under study. 
Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in grey scale) correspond, respectively, to the cases 
where we detect a net pair-wise directional connection in 64-75%, 76-87% and 88-100% of the sample. Node size 
indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland, respectively.  
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Figure 2c: Dynamic net pair-wise directional spillovers for the crisis period. 
                                                  
 
 
 
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections between the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields under study. 
Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in grey scale) correspond, respectively, respectively, to 
the cases where we detect a net pair-wise directional connection in 64-75%, 76-87% and 88-100% of the sample Node 
size indicates sovereign debt market size. GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, NET, BEL AUS, GRE, FIN, POR and IRE stand for 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Greece, Finland, Portugal and Ireland, respectively.  
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Figure 3a:  
Main net spillovers in the pre-crisis period: From central to peripheral countries.  
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Figure 3b:  
Main net spillovers in the crisis period: From peripheral to central countries. 
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